Canadian data residency · made, hosted, and operated in Canada

Early access — 90 days →

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise · TA0004

Privilege Escalation: how an attacker asks for more

Privilege EscalationTA0004

Every intrusion starts small. This is the step where a foothold becomes control — what it costs, what it looks like from the outside, and the telemetry that catches it.

Codein Cybersecurity November 22, 2026 9 min read

For the owner

Most intrusions start small. An attacker signs in with a working password, runs a program from a shared folder, and gets away with more than they should. The moment that program asks for higher rights, the intrusion changes shape.

Nothing about that step is dramatic. It is usually a prompt on a screen, a scheduled job, a service installed to run with full authority, a group membership added to an account. From the outside, the effect is the same as a break-in that was never quiet: one person can now do things they should not, and the systems that were supposed to stop them are configured to help.

This is where small problems become expensive ones. A stolen webmail password is an afternoon. The same password attached to an account with administrative rights over the company is a company. And the escalation is often quiet on purpose, because an interruption is what brings someone running.

Three questions are worth asking your own team:

  1. Which of our accounts can change other accounts or run as the machine's administrator? Most organisations cannot answer this without looking, and the answer is usually longer than expected.
  2. What happens when a staff member or a service needs extra rights? If the answer is "they are given a shared administrator login", the pathway is open to anyone who reaches that login.
  3. Six months from now, can we say which account was given extra rights, by whom, and why? If we cannot, we cannot tell an escalation from routine administration after the fact.

None of this is expensive to fix. Most of it is attention, and most of the attention is spent on granting rights that were never taken back. The reason it is worth attention now is timing: the same intrusion costs far less while it is still a person with a password.

For the analyst

The tactic

MITRE ATT&CK files Privilege Escalation under TA0004. It answers a narrow question: an adversary already has a foothold — how does it acquire more authority than it was given? The matrix files 96 techniques under it, and the pinned SigmaHQ corpus carries 503 rules that name techniques in this tactic.

One property of ATT&CK matters before reading the table: a technique is filed under every tactic it serves. Valid Accounts (T1078) appears here and under Initial Access. Process Injection (T1055) appears here and under Stealth. So 503 is the number of rules that name at least one technique filed here — not the number of distinct ways an attacker can escalate, and not the number of rules you will want running.

The techniques the corpus detects

TechniqueNameRules in the corpus
T1548.002Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control56
T1078Valid Accounts51
T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service38
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts37
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task33
T1098Account Manipulation32
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder31
T1055Process Injection26
T1548Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism23
T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation15
T1546.003Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription11
T1053Scheduled Task/Job9
T1134.001Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft9
T1543Create or Modify System Process9
T1053.002Scheduled Task/Job: At8
T1546.015Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking8
T1098.003Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles7
T1546Event Triggered Execution7
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution7
T1053.003Scheduled Task/Job: Cron6
T1055.001Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection6
T1134.002Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token6
T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification6
T1546.008Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features6
T1546.011Event Triggered Execution: Application Shimming6
T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts5
T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts5
T1546.001Event Triggered Execution: Change Default File Association5
T1055.012Process Injection: Process Hollowing4
T1134Access Token Manipulation4
T1134.003Access Token Manipulation: Make and Impersonate Token4
T1546.002Event Triggered Execution: Screensaver4
T1546.007Event Triggered Execution: Netsh Helper DLL4
T1547.009Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification4
T1547.010Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Port Monitors4
T1037.001Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Logon Script (Windows)3
T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts3
T1098.001Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials3
T1546.013Event Triggered Execution: PowerShell Profile3
T1547.004Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL3
T1055.003Process Injection: Thread Execution Hijacking2
T1055.009Process Injection: Proc Memory2
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent2
T1543.002Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service2
T1543.004Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon2
T1546.009Event Triggered Execution: AppCert DLLs2
T1546.012Event Triggered Execution: Image File Execution Options Injection2
T1611Escape to Host2
T1037.005Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Startup Items1
T1055.011Process Injection: Extra Window Memory Injection1
T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration1
T1098.007Account Manipulation: Additional Local or Domain Groups1
T1134.004Access Token Manipulation: Parent PID Spoofing1
T1134.005Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection1
T1484Domain or Tenant Policy Modification1
T1484.002Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Trust Modification1
T1546.004Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration Modification1
T1546.010Event Triggered Execution: AppInit DLLs1
T1546.014Event Triggered Execution: Emond1
T1547.002Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Authentication Package1
T1547.003Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Time Providers1
T1547.005Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider1
T1547.006Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Kernel Modules and Extensions1
T1547.008Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: LSASS Driver1
T1547.014Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Active Setup1
T1547.015Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Login Items1
T1548.001Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid1
T1548.003Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching1

Five ways an intruder buys authority

Bypassing the prompt (T1548.002, T1548). Windows separates a standard process from an elevated one, and the mechanism that mediates that separation is the target. Attackers do not defeat the policy; they defeat the mechanism: a signed system binary invoked in a way that makes Windows auto-elevate it, a registry entry under the auto-elevate list, a component registered for elevation. The detection problem is that elevation is not rare. On many machines it is ordinary. What is rare is the pairing: an unfamiliar parent process spawning a binary that auto-elevates, with a command line that does not match that binary's ordinary use. The normalised columns that carry it are parent_process, process_name, command_line and user_name.

Buying authority with a configured system (T1543.003, T1543.002, T1053.005, T1053.003, T1053.002, T1547.001). A Windows service, a systemd unit, a scheduled task, a cron entry, a Run key — each is an ordinary administrative object that can run with more authority than the intruder holds. This is the most common escalation path in a small to mid-sized environment, because it requires nothing exotic: create the object, point it at your executable, let it run as the system. The telemetry is windows_sysmon process and registry events with event_type set to the relevant object, file_path showing where the service binary or task action lives, command_line showing the creation call (sc.exe, schtasks, reg add), and user_name naming the account that created it. On Linux the same idea arrives through linux_auditd execution records where user_name becomes root and parent_process is a shell.

Borrowing an identity that already has it (T1134.001, T1134.002, T1134.003, T1055, T1055.001, T1055.012). Token impersonation and theft, creating a process with another account's token, process injection by dynamic-link library injection or process hollowing. Here the attacker creates no privilege at all; they take someone else's. The telemetry is process access and remote-thread creation events, a command_line that starts a target process with someone else's token, and — the field analysts under-use — user_name on the child event. A child whose user_name differs from its parent_process owner's identity is a strong, cheap signal.

Changing the account rather than the machine (T1078, T1078.002, T1078.003, T1078.004, T1098, T1098.001, T1098.003, T1098.007, T1484.001). Account manipulation: adding a group, granting a cloud role, attaching additional credentials, modifying group policy so that rights are granted to the wrong principal. The escalation happens entirely in the identity system. The telemetry is keycloak, m365_audit, gworkspace and cloud audit records: event_type for the role or membership change, user_name of the target, src_ip of the administrative session, message carrying the change description. In many Canadian mid-sized environments this is the only place the escalation is visible at all, because the account change happens on a server that no endpoint agent watches.

Exploiting a flaw in the operating system (T1068, T1611). Kernel and driver exploits, and escaping a container or virtualised process to the host. This is the technique with the least endpoint telemetry and the greatest consequence, because the escalation is invisible to process-creation logging. Rules exist; the honest answer is that they need driver and exploit telemetry that most organisations do not collect, and they are the reason the other four paths deserve the attention.

Where the telemetry comes from

  • windows_sysmon — process creation, image load, registry value sets, service creation. Carries process_name, parent_process, command_line, file_path, user_name.
  • linux_auditd — execution records, privilege transitions, service and unit writes. Carries user_name, parent_process, command_line, file_path.
  • keycloak, m365_audit, gworkspace, cloud — role grants, group membership changes, password resets, administrative sign-ins. Carries event_type, user_name, src_ip, message.
  • firewall_syslog — rarely relevant to the escalation itself and valuable immediately after it, when the escalated identity starts talking to a new destination.

The general shape: the endpoint sees the attempt to escalate, the identity system sees the grant. Coverage of only one of the two produces a false sense of security, and the false negative below is exactly that case.

What the numbers do and do not tell you

503 rules map to this tactic because the corpus is broad and because ATT&CK files the same technique under several tactics. It does not mean 503 independent ways to be attacked.

Coverage is also uneven in a way that matters. The techniques with many rules are the ones whose artefacts are visible in ordinary telemetry — the elevation bypass, the service install, the scheduled task. The techniques with one or two rules are the obscure corners, and those are where a genuinely novel intrusion would live. What the corpus gives you is a floor, not a ceiling.

Detection engineering notes

  • Anchor on the identity change, not on the tool. "A scheduled task was created" fires on every deployment and every patch cycle. "A scheduled task was created by an account that has never created one" fires rarely and means something.
  • Parent-child relationships are the cheapest high-value signal. Elevation almost always arrives through a parent that does not normally spawn it: a document handler, a browser, a scripting interpreter, a service manager.
  • Watch the user, not only the binary. A privileged user_name appearing on a host it has never touched, or a standard account becoming privileged mid-session, is rarer and stronger than any list of executable names.
  • Baseline your own administration or drown in noise. Software deployment, patch agents and backup products create services, tasks and Run keys legitimately. A rule set that fires on all of them is muted, and a muted rule set protects nothing.
  • Correlate forward, not only backward. The strongest signal is often the escalation followed by behaviour the escalated identity has never shown: a new source address, a new destination, a new file location.

Where analysts get this wrong, and what a false negative looks like

The most common error is treating a rule count as coverage. A rule that needs an event stream you do not collect is not a detection; it is a document. The second common error is assuming escalation means full control of a machine. In a mid-sized organization the escalation that matters is often a cloud role, a password reset or membership of a distribution group, and none of those touch an endpoint.

A false negative looks like this: an intruder who already holds a valid administrator session requests one more right through the ordinary help-desk process. Every tool fired exactly as designed. The request came from an address inside the corporate range, from an account with a legitimate history of administering, on a Tuesday afternoon. The escalation is visible in the identity audit trail and nowhere else, and it looks like Tuesday.

Where DetectMonkey fits

Privilege escalation is the step where a chain of small events becomes one expensive event, which makes it a detection-latency problem as much as a coverage problem. The escalation attempt, the object created to carry it, and the identity change that authorised it can all arrive within seconds of each other — but only if the endpoint stream and the identity stream are evaluated together, as the events arrive rather than after they are indexed. A detection that lands an hour later is a different product than one that lands in the first minute, because the hour is when the intruder takes the actions you will have to explain.

DetectMonkey is built for that shape of work. The collectors carry endpoint process, registry and service events alongside identity audit records, the pinned corpus of 3164 detection rules is evaluated as the events arrive, and every alert arrives with the evidence that produced it, in English and French. The platform detects and alerts. It does not isolate, quarantine, block or remediate anything on your systems, and it does not change your configuration. Telemetry is processed and stored on private servers operated by Codein in New Brunswick, Canada — not in a public cloud.

Early access is 90 days at no charge, for up to 100 seats, with founder-led onboarding and no card required.

See it on your own telemetry

Early access is 90 days at no charge, for up to 100 seats, founder-led onboarding, no card required.